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Abstract—We develop a new Location Verification System
(LVS) focussed on network-based Intelligent Transport Systems
and vehicular ad hoc networks. The algorithm we develop is
based on an information-theoretic framework which uses the
received signal strength (RSS) from a network of base-stations
and the claimed position. Based on this information we derive the
optimal decision regarding the verification of the user’s location.
Our algorithm is optimal in the sense of maximizing the mutual
information between its input and output data. Our approach
is based on the practical scenario in which a non-colluding
malicious user some distance from a highway optimally boosts
his transmit power in an attempt to fool the LVS that he is on
the highway. We develop a practical threat model for this attack
scenario, and investigate in detail the performance of the LVS in
terms of its input/output mutual information. We show how our
LVS decision rule can be implemented straightforwardly with a
performance that delivers near-optimality under realistic threat
conditions, with information-theoretic optimality approached as
the malicious user moves further from the highway. The prac-
tical advantages our new information-theoretic scheme delivers
relative to more traditional Bayesian verification frameworks are
discussed.
Index Terms—Location Verification, Wireless Networks, Mu-
tual Information, Likelihood Ratio Test, Decision Rule, Threat
Model.
I. INTRODUCTION
The almost ubiquitous use of position information in emerg-
ing wireless networks has made the issue of wireless location
determination and location-based services a very active re-
search topic in recent years, e.g. see ( [1]–[10]). This in turn
has made the supplementary issue of Location verification in
wireless networks an area of increasing importance. This is
in part a consequence of not only the growing number of
mobile services that utilize location information, but also in
part due to the mission-critical nature the location information
being supplied has on the performance, security and safety
of some services. The importance of location verification
is perhaps best illustrated in emerging Intelligent Transport
Systems (ITS) and vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs)
where the verification of the location information supplied by
vehicles is vital to the safety issues ITS (and VANETs) hope
to address [11]. Indeed, recently there has been much effort
in analyzing how a Location Verification System (LVS) in the
context of ITS may operate [12]–[19]. Such ITS-based LVS
work is also considered in other recent research efforts on
location verification in more generic wireless network settings
(e.g. [20]–[31]).
In an LVS one aims at verifying a user’s claimed position
based on some input measurements so as to perform a binary
decision on whether the user is legitimate (claims his true posi-
tion) or malicious (spoofs his claimed position). In general, an
LVS aims at obtaining a low false positive rate for legitimate
users and a high detection rate for malicious users, leading
to a tradeoff perhaps best illustrated by a receiver operating
characteristic (ROC) curve. However, it is established that
ROCs are not always ideal in comparing performances of two
separate systems (e.g. [32], [33]). It is also the case that the
use of a ROC does not in any formal sense indicate what the
optimal operating point of an LVS is. A possible direction to
follow in attempting an optimization of an LVS is to utilize
a Bayesian hypothesis test, which with uninformative priors
contains the structure of a Likelihood Ratio Test (LRT) -
which minimizes the input/output classification error in the
scenario where the cost of all types of misclassifications are
equal [27]. Additionally, if the costs of misclassifications are
not equal, then a variation of the LRT decision rule can be
formed, namely the Bayes criterion [34]. The Maximum A
Posteriori criterion and the Maximum Likelihood criterion are
special cases of the Bayes criterion. However, it is well known
that these Bayes-decision criteria possess a weakness - they
are subjective. This subjectivity arises through the necessity
to pre-assign costs to the different types of misclassification.
It has been discussed before how such subjectivity in Bayes
criteria can give rise to confusion when comparisons of
detector performances are made [32], [33] . As such, although
many of the previous works on LVSs have their own specific
verification performance goals in mind, and their own pros
and cons, none of these works identify an optimal LVS in any
non-subjective sense.
To make progress, what is actually required is an objective
measure of detector performance, namely a single unified
metric that takes into account all key aspects of intrusion
detection in an objective fashion. As argued in [33], this
metric should be the information-theoretic mutual information,
and it is this approach we develop here in the context of
location verification. More specifically, we develop here an
information-theoretic framework for an LVS in which the
mutual information between the input and output LVS data is
used as the objective optimization criterion. Some preliminary
work along these lines has been attempted but only for
sub-optimal decision rules [35]. In this work we pursue an
information-theoretic framework in which the decision rule is
2an optimal one.
In general an LVS can be characterized as follows. The
input data (users to be verified) are represented by binary
random variables X = x, x ∈ [0, 1], whose realized elements
indicate legitimate (x = 0) or malicious (x = 1). Likewise
the output data can be represented by binary random variables
Y = y, y ∈ [0, 1], whose realized elements indicate the binary
decision made by the LVS, namely verified (y = 0) or not
verified (y = 1). In the LVS, a decision rule is formed which
indicates whether a user is malicious or not. This decision
rule ultimately forms a test on whether some statistic (derived
from network measurements and some prior information) is
less than or equal to some threshold. With these definitions
in place, the contributions of this paper can be specifically
summarized thus.
1) We develop for the first time an information-theoretic
framework for an LVS, which allows us to utilize the
mutual information between X and Y as a unique
criterion to evaluate and optimize the performance of
an LVS.
2) Under the assumption of known likelihood functions for
the measurements, we prove that the likelihood ratio
is the test statistic that produces the maximum mutual
information between X and Y .
3) Identifying the threshold value that maximizes the mu-
tual information between X and Y , we then show
how the Likelihood Ratio Test (LRT) is the decision
rule which maximizes the mutual information between
X and Y , and leads to the information-theoretic opti-
mal LVS. We take the further step of determining the
likelihood functions under a series of threat models.
This leads to a working LVS that will be an optimal
information-theoretic approach under the given threat
models.
4) We show from our analysis how an effectively optimal
LVS, which is simple to deploy in practice, can be
developed. We show that our LVS leads to an optimal
solution for most realistic attack scenarios in which
a malicious user who is outside a network region, is
attempting to spoof that he is within the network region.
We further show how optimality is approached as the
malicious user moves further from the network region.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section
II presents both the general network system model and our
information-theoretic LVS framework. The decision rule that
optimizes mutual information is constructed in Section III. In
Section IV, analysis and simulations of our LVS are presented
for a realistic threat model. Section V concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND LVS FRAMEWORK
In this section, we first present the general location veri-
fication system model and the related assumptions. Then, we
develop an information-theoretic framework for an LVS, which
allows us to utilize the mutual information between X and Y
as an unique criterion to evaluate and optimize an LVS.
A. General System Model
The values of the input data X can be represented as two
hypotheses. The first of these is the null hypothesis,H0, which
assumes the user to be verified is legitimate (x = 0). The
second one is the alternative hypothesis, H1, which assumes
the user to be verified is malicious (x = 1). Likewise, the
possible values of the output data Y can be represented as
two decisions, where D0 denotes verified (y = 0), and D1
denotes not verified (y = 1). We now outline the general LVS
model, and detail the assumptions we use.
1) A single user (legitimate or malicious) reports his
claimed location, θc = (uc, vc) ∈ R2, to a network with
K (K > 2) Base Stations (BSs) in the communication
range of the user (the K BSs are not in a line), where
θ
BS
i = (u
BS
i , v
BS
i ) ∈ R2 is the location of the ith BS,
i = 1, 2, ...,K . One of the K BSs is the Process Center
(PC), and all other BSs will transmit the measurements
collected from the user to the PC. The PC is to make
decisions based on the user’s claimed location and the
measurements collected by all the K BSs. We assume
all BSs are perfectly synchronized.
2) We assume a user (legitimate or malicious) knows the
locations of the K BSs, and that θc is supplied by the
user to the PC.
3) For the legitimate user, we assume the true location is
given by θ = θc (here we will ignore the small location
determination error, e.g. the GPS error1). We assume
the malicious user’s true location θ = (u, v) ∈ R2 is
known exactly to him (i.e. again we ignore any small
localization error), but is unknown to the network.
4) We assume θ is a bivariate random variable following
some distribution. The prior distribution, i.e. the proba-
bility density function (pdf), for θ under H1 is denoted
as p(θ|H1).
5) In general, the measurement (Mi) collected by the ith
BS from a legitimate user is dependent on θBSi and the
legitimate user’s θc. In practice, a malicious user can
impact the measurements collected by all BSs in order to
avoid detection. Thus, the measurement (Mi) collected
by the ith BS from a malicious user is some function
of θBSi and the malicious user’s θ and his spoofed θc.
Therefore, the measurement (Mi) collected by the ith
BS can be given as a composite model as follows:{ H0 : Mi = h0 (θBSi , θc, ω)
H1 : Mi = h1
(
θ
BS
i , θ
c, θ, ω
)
,
(1)
where h0 and h1 are some functions yet to be specified
(can involve additional parameters), and ω is random
variable representing the communication channel noise.
Given the statistical nature of ω, the composite system
model in (1) can produce the likelihood functions un-
der H0 and H1, which are denoted as p(m|H0) and
p(m|H1), respectively, where m = [m1,m2, ...,mK ]
is a realization of the measurement vector, M =
[M1,M2, ...,MK ].
1When this error is much smaller than the average distance between BSs
the effect on the results is negligible.
3Fig. 1. A Location Verification System (LVS) model.
6) We also assume a user is legitimate with a known prior
probability, which is P0 = P (x = 0). The probability of
a user to be malicious is denoted as P1, and P1 = 1−P0.
B. Information-Theoretic Framework for an LVS
In general, the purpose of an LVS is to map the input data
X to the output data Y , X → Y , and can be represented as
shown in Fig. 1. In this figure, the false positive rate, α, and
the detection rate, β, are given as follows
α = P (D1|H0), 1− α = P (D0|H0),
β = P (D1|H1), 1− β = P (D0|H1),
where P is the probability of an outcome conditional on
a hypotheses. The mutual information between X and Y
can be expressed as I(X ;Y ) = H(X) − H(X |Y ), where
H(X) is the entropy of X , and H(X |Y ) is the conditional
entropy of X given Y . Given P0, the entropy of the dis-
crete binary random variable X can be written as H(X) =
−∑x P (X) log2 P (X) = −P0 log2 P0 − (1 − P0) log2(1 −
P0). With these definitions, the conditional entropy H(X |Y )
can be expressed as in [32]
H(X |Y ) = −
∑
x
∑
y
P (X,Y ) log2 P (X |Y )
= P0(1−α)
(
−log2
P0(1−α)
P0(1−α) + (1−P0)(1−β)
)
+ P0α
(
−log2
P0α
P0α+(1−P0)β
)
+ (1−P0)(1−β)
(
−log2
(1−P0)(1−β)
P0(1−α)+(1−P0)(1−β)
)
+ (1−P0)β
(
−log2
(1−P0)β
P0α+(1−P0)β
)
.
(2)
The mutual information I(X,Y ) measures the reduction of
uncertainty of the input X given the output Y . For example, if
we make verification decisions without any observations (e.g.
of received signal strengths), X and Y will be independent of
each other, and I(X ;Y ) will be minimized (zero). However,
based on some observations our LVS attempts to map X into
Y so as to minimize the uncertainty of X given Y . An extreme
example of this is when X and Y are identical and therefore
I(X ;Y ) is maximized (of course this would require infinite
noisy observations or finite noiseless observations). More
generally, given some finite noisy observations, maximizing
on the mutual information I(X ;Y ) leads to decisions which
maximize the dependence of X and Y . As such, the mutual
information is the natural optimization metric for an LVS from
an information-theoretic viewpoint. The information-theoretic
optimal location verification algorithm can be defined as the
one which maximizes I(X ;Y ) defined above.
III. THE OPTIMAL LOCATION VERIFICATION ALGORITHM
In this section, based on the assumption of known likelihood
functions under both H0 and H1, we take the additional
step of identifying the information-theoretic optimal location
verification algorithm, which produces the maximum I(X ;Y )
relative to any other location verification algorithm.
A. The Decision Rule for Maximizing I(X ;Y )
In the context of an LVS, a location verification algorithm
must formulate a decision rule to infer whether the user is
consistent with H0 or H1. The algorithm ultimately forms a
comparison of some test statistic, F (m), and a corresponding
threshold, TF , in the form of
F (m)
D1≥
<
D0
TF .
For a given F (m), we will be interested in the value of TF
which maximizes I(X ;Y ), i.e., T ∗F = argmax
TF
I(X ;Y ). Fur-
thermore, we will be interested in determining the functional
form of F (m) that maximizes I(X ;Y ). This leads to our
main result, which is stated in Theorem 1.
Theorem 1: Given the decision rule
F (m)
D1≥
<
D0
T ∗F , (3)
the functional form of F (m) that maximizes the mutual
information I(X ;Y ) is Λ (m), where
Λ (m) ,
p (m|H1)
p (m|H0) . (4)
To prove Theorem 1, we first introduce two lemmas, of
which the first is the Neyman-Pearson Lemma [36].
Lemma 1: Consider two hypotheses H0 and H1, the deci-
sion rule to maximize a detection rate (β) for a given false
positive rate (α) is
Λ (m)
D1≥
<
D0
TΛ, (5)
where TΛ is determined by the specified value of α. For proof,
see [36]. Before proceeding, we note α < β will be a basic
requirement for any useful LVS.
Lemma 2: Given the assumption α < β, the mutual in-
formation I(X ;Y ) is a monotonic increasing function of the
detection rate β.
4Proof of Lemma 2: Since H(X) is not dependent on
β, the first derivative of I(X ;Y ) with respect to β can be
expressed as
∂I(X ;Y )
∂β
=
∂ (H(X)−H(X |Y ))
∂β
= −∂H(X |Y )
∂β
= (1− P0)
(
log2
β[P0(1− α) + (1 − P0)(1 − β)]
(1− β)[P0α+ (1− P0)β]
)
= (1− P0) log2 {β[P0(1 − α) + (1− P0)(1− β)]}︸ ︷︷ ︸
V0
− (1− P0) log2 {[P0α+ (1 − P0)β](1 − β)}︸ ︷︷ ︸
V1
.
Note, since 0 < P0 < 1, and the logarithm is a monotonic
increasing function of z, then ∂I(X ;Y )/∂β has the same sign
as (V0 − V1), where
V0 − V1 = β[P0(1− α) + (1− P0)(1− β)]
− [P0α+ (1− P0)β](1 − β)
= P0(β − α).
Thus, given the assumption α < β, then ∂I(X ;Y )/∂β > 0,
and Lemma 2 is proved.
Given Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, we now prove Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 1: If the specified value of α in
Lemma 1 is that which results in the value T ∗F of (3), then by
Lemma 2 the result follows.
B. The Optimal Location Verification Algorithm
Based on the above discussion, the optimal information-
theoretic location verification algorithm is presented in Algo-
rithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Optimal Location Verification Algorithm
Input: priori probability P0, likelihood functions.
Output: binary decisions D1 and D0.
1: Determine the functional forms of h0 and h1 in (1).
2: Specify the prior distributions for θ, p(θ|H0) and
p(θ|H1), and determine the likelihood functions p(m|H0)
and p(m|H1).
3: With (5) as the general decision rule, derive the functional
form of α and β. Note, α and β will be functions of TΛ.
4: Using I(X ;Y ) as the objective function, search for T ∗Λ,
which is the value of TΛ that maximizes I(X ;Y ).
5: Collect measurements and calculate the likelihood ratio
Λ(m) according to the likelihood functions determined
in step 2.
6: Form the optimal decision rule,
Λ(m)
D1≥
<
D0
T ∗Λ. (6)
IV. SPECIFIC OPTIMAL LOCATION VERIFICATION
ALGORITHM WITH RSS AS MEASUREMENTS
In order to implement the optimal location verification al-
gorithm, in this section we take the further step of determining
the likelihood functions under H0 and H1 with Received
Signal Strength (RSS) as the system measurements, and we
consider the algorithm under a series of threat models.
Although the framework we develop can be built on any
measurement (location information metric), such as RSS,
TOA (time of arrival) and TDOA (time difference of arrival),
for purposes of illustration we focus here only on an RSS
implementation. In this case, the measurement Mi is the RSS
(in dB) collected by the ith BS. We will also assume that the
legitimate user and all BSs are equipped with only a single
omni-direction antenna.
Let us define the set of BSs that are within range of a
legitimate user positioned at θc as the in-range BSs. This set
of BSs forms an effective perimeter for the network used in
the location verification. We will assume a single malicious
user has the technology (e.g. directional beam-forming), which
allows him to ensure (if required) that from some position
outside the perimeter only the in-range BSs receive a non-
zero RSS. The malicious user can set the power of the main
directional beam. We do not allow an adversary to set multiple
beams to different BSs via colluding malicious users (see later
discussion).
Based on the log-normal propagation model [37], h0 in (1)
can be specified as
h0(θ
BS
i , θ
c, ω) = P0 − 10γ log10
(
dci
d0
)
+ ω, (7)
where P0 is a reference received power, d0 is the reference
distance, γ is the path loss exponent, ω (in dB) is a zero-mean
normal random variable with variance σ2dB , and the Euclidean
distance of the ith BS to the user’s claimed location θc =
(uc, vc) is
dci = d(θ
c, θBSi ) =
√
(uc − uBSi )2 + (vc − vBSi )2.
A malicious user can adjust his transmit power to impact the
measurements collected by the BSs, thus h1 in (1) can be
expressed as
h1(θ
BS
i , θ
c, θ, ω) = P0 + Px − 10γ log10
(
dti
d0
)
+ ω, (8)
where Px is a power level set by the malicious user, and dti =
d(θ, θBSi ) is the Euclidean distance of the ith BS to the user’s
true location θ = (u, v).
Assuming all Mi’s are independent from each other, the
likelihood function p(m|H0) can be expressed as
p(m|H0) =
K∏
i=1
p(mi|H0)
=
K∏
i=1
1√
2piσdB
exp
(
− (mi − µci)2
2σ2dB
)
,
(9)
5where
µci =P0−10γ log10
(
dci
d0
)
.
Also, the pdf of M conditional on θ under H1, p(m|θ,H1),
can be written as
p(m|θ,H1) =
K∏
i=1
p(mi|θ,H1)
=
K∏
i=1
1√
2piσdB
exp
−
(
mi−P0−Px+10γ log10
(
dt
i
d0
))2
2σ2dB
 .
(10)
In general, a malicious user will utilize Px in an attempt
to impact the measurements collected by the BSs in order
to avoid detection. We now discuss how to determine the
‘optimal’ value of Px from a malicious user’s point of view. An
LVS can be spoofed optimally if the measurements collected
from a malicious user follow exactly p(m|H0), which is given
by (9). Therefore, in order to avoid detection a malicious user
attempts to minimize the difference between p(m|H0) and
p(m|θ,H1). This difference can be quantified through the
KL-divergence between the two likelihood functions, which
is defined as follows [38]
DKL(p(m|H0)||p(m|θ,H1))
=
∫
p(m|H0) ln p(m|H0)
p(m|θ,H1)dm
=
K∑
i=1
(µci − µti − Px)2
2σ2dB
,
where
µti=P0−10γ log10
(
dti
d0
)
.
This KL-divergence is the information lost when p(m|θ,H1)
is used to approximate p(m|H0), and it becomes zero if
and only if the two distributions are identical. From an
information-theoretic point of view the optimal value of Px
can be expressed as
P ∗x = argmin
Px
DKL (p(m|H0||p(m|θ,H1))
=
1
K
K∑
i=1
(
µci − µti
)
.
(11)
Setting Px = P ∗x in (8), h1 can be rewritten as
h1(θ
BS
i , θ
c, θ, ω)=P0+µ¯
c−µ¯t−10γ log10
(
dti
d0
)
+ω, (12)
where
µ¯c =
1
K
K∑
i=1
µci , and µ¯
t =
1
K
K∑
i=1
µti.
Although θ is a known deterministic parameter for a malicious
user, it is unknown for the network. This means h1 is still
unknown, and therefore the likelihood function p(m|H1) is
unknown for the LVS. To make progress, we will assume
some realistic threat models within which p(m|H1) becomes
known.
Fig. 2. Illustration of the Minimum Distance (MD) threat model.
A. Threat Model
The threat model we adopt can in principle accommodate
any true/spoofed location pair. However, as the spoofed lo-
cation approaches the true location, our detection rate will
approach zero (as expected for any verification system). As
such, in the following we will make the assumption that
the true position of an attacker is some minimum distance
from the spoofed position. To quantify this we will assume
that this distance is always greater than the mean separation
distance between BSs. This is a reasonable assumption since
it is unlikely an attacker will try to spoof a location too close
to his actual locale, for fear of apprehension. Pragmatically,
this assumption also means that in effect the attacker will be
placed at some minimum distance off the highway, since we
find that if he is on the highway, under our minimum distance
assumption, he is trivially detectable.2
We henceforth refer to our generic threat model as the
Minimum Distance (MD) threat model, a schematic of which
is given in Fig. 2. In this scenario it is assumed the BSs
that form the infrastructure part of the VANET, are placed
alongside the highway (or on overhanging structures along
the highway). This represents a realistic expectation for the
physical deployment architecture for VANETs that is emerging
from the ITS community.
However, before presenting the details of the DM threat
model, we will first consider some simplifying approxima-
tions, which although not adopted in the DM threat model,
do allow for additional insight and analytical clarity. We will
also show how the optimal threshold derived for the MD threat
model is effectively the same as the optimal threshold derived
under some of the simplifying approximations.
2A malicious user (vehicle) on the highway claiming to be at a position
which is at least the mean separation distance between BSs, must boost its
transmissions significantly. However, since the user is on the actual highway,
the nearest BS to its true location will easily detect an attack. This is confirmed
by our analysis, and as such we will henceforth consider the attacker to
be sophisticated enough to realize that to have any reasonable chance of
remaining undetected he must launch his attacks from a position at some
minimum distance from the closet VANET BS (i.e. off the highway).
61) Far Field Approximation (FFA): In this subsection we
propose the deployment of our LVS within a threat model
where the far-field approximation (FFA) is made, meaning that
the malicious user’s distance from the highway is far enough
that we can assume all RSS values received by all BSs are
equal. Although never achieved in practice this simplification
will allow us some initial insight into the performance of the
LVS. Under the FFA we can take the distance of a malicious
user’s true location to every BS to be approximated as a
constant, i.e. dti = d(θ, θ
BS
i )
∼= constant, ∀i ∈ [1, 2, . . . ,K].
Therefore, we will assume
1
K
K∑
i=1
10γ log10
(
dti
d0
)
= 10γ log10
(
dti
d0
)
. (13)
Substituting (13) into (12), h1 under the FFA can be expressed
as
h1
(
θ
BS
i , θ
c, ω
)
= µ¯c + ω. (14)
Then, p(m|H1) (which now does not depend on θ) can be
written as
p(m|H1) =
K∏
i=1
1√
2piσdB
exp
(
− (mi − µ¯c)2
2σ2dB
)
. (15)
Based on (4), (9) and (15), we construct the decision rule
Λ (m) =
exp
(−∑K
i=1
(mi−µ¯c)2
2σ2
dB
)
exp
(−∑K
i=1
(mi−µci )2
2σ2
dB
) D1≥
<
D0
TΛ. (16)
In order to help determine α and β analytically, this decision
rule can be rewritten as
̥(m)
D1≥
<
D0
Γ, (17a)
where
̥(m) =
K∑
i=1
mi(µ¯
c − µci ), (17b)
and
Γ =
1
2
(
2σ2dB lnTΛ −
K∑
i=1
(
(µci )
2 − (µ¯c)2)) . (17c)
Given (9) and (17) , we have
p (̥(m)|H0) = N
(
K∑
i=1
µci (µ¯
c − µci) ,
K∑
i=1
(µ¯c − µci )2 σ2dB
)
,
where N(a, b) represents a normal distribution with a and b
as the mean and variance, respectively. Likewise, given (15)
and (17), we have
p (̥(m)|H1) = N
(
K∑
i=1
µ¯c (µ¯c − µci) ,
K∑
i=1
(µ¯c − µci )2 σ2dB
)
.
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Fig. 3. Analytical and simulated α, β and Normalized Mutual Information
(NMI) with different values of TΛ, where K = 10, L = 1, and σdB = 5.
The false positive and detection rates under the FFA can now
be expressed analytically as
α = P (Λ(m) > TΛ|H0) = P (̥(m) > Γ|H0)
= Q
 Γ−∑Ki=1 µci (µ¯c − µci )√∑K
i=1 (µ¯
c − µci )2 σ2dB
 , (18)
β = P (Λ(m) > TΛ|H1) = P (̥(m) > Γ|H1)
= Q
 Γ−∑Ki=1 µ¯c (µ¯c − µci )√∑K
i=1 (µ¯
c − µci )2 σ2dB
 , (19)
where Q(x) = 1√
2pi
∫∞
x
exp−t
2/2 dt.
Having determined α and β under the FFA, we can use
these in (2) for the conditional entropy H(X |Y ). The value
of Γ which maximizes I(X ;Y ) = H(X)−H(X |Y ), denoted
as Γ∗, can be determined numerically. Using (17c), the T ∗Λ
can be determined by Γ∗. Then, the decision rule in (6) which
leads to the optimal verification algorithm under the FFA can
be formed, where Λ(m) is specified in (16).
We verify the false positive and detection rates, given by
(18) and (19), respectively, via detailed Monte Carlo simu-
lations. The simulation settings are chosen so as to mimic a
location verification test over an area spanning the intersection
of several major freeways:
• The K BSs are randomly distributed in a 200m× 200m
square area, 4 ≤ K ≤ 10.
• The claimed locations of legitimate and malicious users
are the same, which is θc = [0, 0].
• The legitimate users are at θc. The malicious users are
infinitely far away from θc, which in practice means the
measurements collected are generated according to (14).
• Each BS collects L measurements from each user.
In the following, the simulation results are obtained through
10,000 Monte Carlo realizations of the measurement vector
M , and in all the specific results shown we have adopted the
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Fig. 4. Maximum Normalized Mutual Information (NMI) with different
values of K and σdB , where L = 1.
prior probability P0 = 0.9, and the path loss exponent γ =
3. Also note, we denote the Normalized Mutual Information
(NMI) as
NMI = I(X ;Y )/H(X). (20)
In Fig. 3, the analytical α and β are directly derived
from (18) and (19), respectively, and the analytical NMI is
calculated using (2), (18), (19) and (20). In order to obtain
the simulated α, we randomly generate M according to (7),
from which we get a specific realization of Λ(m), and for
each value of TΛ we decide whether the user is legitimate or
malicious by (16). To obtain the simulated β, we randomly
generateM according to (14), and follow the same procedure
as above for α. The simulated NMI are calculated using (2)
and (20) with the simulated α and β as the input. In Fig. 3
we have set K = 10, L = 1, and σdB = 5. From Fig. 3, we
can see that the comparison between simulation and analysis
shows excellent agreement, which verifies the analysis we
have provided under the FFA. As we can see from Fig. 3,
relatively high false positive rates are found at low thresholds.
This is a consequence of the LVS operating at a point far
from the optimal threshold. However, we see that at the
information-theoretic optimal threshold, which maximizes the
NMI, the false positive rate is approximately 4%. This strong
dependence on the threshold (also seen in all our other results),
re-emphasizes the critical importance of always operating the
LVS at the optimal threshold. We have investigated a range of
other values of K , L and σdB . Some of these results are shown
in Fig. 4, where the maximum NMI is shown as a function of
σdB for different values of K . From Fig. 4, we see again the
simulations agree with the analytical results.
2) Uniformly Distributed Approximation (UDA): In this
subsection we propose the Uniformly Distributed Approxi-
mation (UDA), where the malicious users are assumed to
be uniformly distributed on a circle. Again, although never
achievable in practice this simplification will allow us addi-
tional insights. More specifically, the malicious user’s true
location is uniformly distributed on a circle, whose radius
and center are R and θc, respectively, where R > r, and
r = max(dci ).
The main purpose of this model is to commence our
probe of how reliable the use of the FFA will be when its
assumptions are violated. To this end, we note that if the
maximum difference between any two measurements collected
from a malicious user, Mi and Mj (i 6= j), is no larger
than σdB , the scale R at which this occurs provides a natural
distance at which we could anticipate the FFA and the UDA to
be approximately equivalent. To quantify this let us introduce
ρ , R/r. Under the UDA, the difference between Mi and Mj
can be written as
|Mi−Mj| =
∣∣∣∣10γ log10( dtid0
)
−10γ log10
(
dtj
d0
)∣∣∣∣ . (21)
Given that for a malicious user, we have max(|dti−dtj |) = 2r,
and min(dti) = R− r, we can write (21) as
|Mi−Mj| ≤ 10γ
ln 10
ln
(
dti+2r
dti
)
≤ 10γ
ln 10
ln
(
1+
2r
R−r
)
,
where without loss of generality we have assumed dtj > dti . In
order to guarantee the required constraint max |Mi −Mj | ≤
σdB , we should have
10γ
ln 10
ln
(
1 +
2r
R− r
)
≤ σdB,
which results in
ρ ≥ ρ∗ , 2
exp
{
σdB ln 10
10γ
}
− 1
+ 1, (22)
where ρ∗ is a reference value that will be utilized when
comparison under the FFA is made. Such a comparison is
achieved by using the FFA decision rule in (16) but under the
UDA. In such a set up we would anticipate that the optimal
thresholds of under the FFA and UDA would be very similar
at ρ∗.
To proceed with a comparison under the FFA and UDA we
conduct Monte Carlo simulations. In these simulations, note
that although p(m|H0) as given by (9) is used, the likelihood
p(m|H1) given
p(m|H1) =
∫
p(m|θ,H1)p(θ|H1)dθ. (23)
must be determined numerically. The other simulation settings
are the same as under the FFA, except the malicious users
are uniformly distributed on a circle, whose radius and center
are R and θc, respectively. The measurements collected from
the legitimate and malicious users are generated according to
(7) and (12), respectively. To obtain the true numerical NMI
under the UDA, we use (9) and (23) to calculate p(m|H0) and
p(m|H1), respectively, and utilize (5) as the decision rule. To
simulate the NMI obtained from the use of the FFA decision
rule (but under the UDA) we use (9) and (15) in order to
implement the decision rule in (16).
From our results, shown in Fig. 5, we can see that at
values of ρ << ρ∗ the optimal thresholds (the values of
TΛ which maximize the NMI) for the two cases are very
different. However, as ρ→ ρ∗ the optimal threshold obtained
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Fig. 5. Normalized Mutual Information (NMI) with different values of ρ,
where K = 10, L = 1, σdB = 5, and ρ∗ = 5.275. The solid curves
represent the NMI achieved under the correct decision rule (5). The dashed
curves represent the NMI achieved under the FFA decision rule (16).
under blindly adopting the FFA decision rule (even though
the malicious user is not at infinity) is effectively the optimal
value. Note also, the maximum values of the two NMIs and the
corresponding T ∗Λ are coincident when ρ = ρ∗, which verifies
that the reference value of ρ in (22) is reasonable.
3) The DM Threat Model: In this subsection we imple-
ment the optimal location verification algorithm under our
adopted threat model - the DM threat model. In this model
p(θ|H1) is assumed to be uniform over the annulus formed
by two concentric circles, whose finite radii are R1 and
R2 (R1 < R2), respectively, and whose mutual center is
θ
c
. The use of an annulus setting allows us to cover more
general settings (beyond just single highways/freeways) such
as freeway intersection regions where the the freeways can
have multiple directions. In any scenario (single or intersecting
roads) it will be assumed that the malicious user will not enter
into any region (we assume the malicious users knows the
locations of all BSs) where he is less than some distance R1
from any of the VANET’s infrastructure BSs (see footnote 2).
This implies p(θ|H1) = 1/pi(R22−R21), where θ ∈ {θ|R21 ≤
(u − uc)2 + (v − vc)2 ≤ R22}. Under this model, p(m|H0)
is also the same as in (9), and p(m|H1) is as given in (23)
but with the modified prior distribution. Again, no closed form
solution is available for (23).
We present new Monte Carlo simulations where the settings
are again the same as under the FFA, except that now the ma-
licious users are uniformly distributed in the annulus. Again,
the measurements collected from the legitimate and malicious
users are generated according to (7) and (12), respectively. To
obtain the true numerical NMI under the DM threat model,
we use (9) and (23) to calculate p(m|H0) and p(m|H1),
respectively, and utilize (5) as the decision rule. To simulate
the NMI obtained from the use of the FFA decision rule (but
under the DM threat model) we use (9) and (15) in order
to implement the decision rule in (16). The results of our
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Fig. 6. Numerical and IFA approximated Normalized Mutual Information
(NMI) with different values of R2, ρ∗ = 5.275, ρ = 0.2×ρ∗, and σdB = 5.
The solid curves represent the NMI achieved under the correct decision rule
(5). The dashed curves represent the NMI achieved under the FFA decision
rule (16).
simulations are shown in Fig. 6, where ρ = 0.2ρ∗, and ρ
is redefined as ρ = R1/r.
In the top left plot of Fig. 6, we have set R2 = R1, so in this
specific plot the DM threat model is equivalent to that under
the UDA (the result is the same as that shown in the top right
plot of Fig. 5). However, again we see that as R2 increases
the optimal threshold obtained under blindly adopting the FFA
decision rule (even though the malicious users are constrained
within an annulus) is effectively the optimal value. Note also,
that in the DM threat model, as R2 increases this results holds
for cases when ρ << ρ∗ (which was not the case under the
UDA).
As a final point, we note that instead of numerically solving
(23), it may be useful to find an approximate closed-form so-
lution to (23) (e.g. this would allow for an approximate closed-
form for the false positive and detection rates under this threat
model). We can approximate p(m|H1) via an application of
the Laplace approximation, which can approximate integrals
through a series expansion by using local information about
the integrand around its maximum [39] [40]. The details are
as follows. First, let us define a quantity as:
h (θ|H1) , ln (p (m|θ,H1) p (θ|H1)) .
h (θ|H1) can be expanded using a Taylor series around its
maximum a-posteriori (MAP) estimate, denoted by Θ̂ =
argmax
θ
{p(m|θ,H1)p(θ|H1)}. This is the point where the
posterior density is maximized, i.e., the mode of the posterior
distribution. Hence, we obtain to second order,
h (θ|H1) = h
(
Θ̂|H1
)
+
(
θ − Θ̂
)T ∂h(Θ̂|H1)
∂θ︸ ︷︷ ︸
(=0) at MAP location
+
1
2
(
θ − Θ̂
)T ∂2h(Θ̂|H1)
∂2θ
(
θ − Θ̂
)
.
(24)
9The second term in (24) is 0, because the first derivative is
zero at the maximum of h (θ|H1). Replacing h (θ|H1) by the
truncated second-order Taylor series yields:
h (θ|H1) ≈ h
(
Θ̂|H1
)
+
1
2
(
θ − Θ̂
)H
H
(
θ − Θ̂
)
,
where H is the Hessian of the ln posterior, evaluated at Θ̂:
H ,
∂2h
(
Θ̂|H1
)
∂2θ
∣∣∣∣∣∣
θ=Θ̂
=
∂2h (θ|H1)
∂θ∂θH
∣∣∣∣
θ=Θ̂
.
Using the above approximation, we have the following
ln p (m|H1) = ln
∫
p (m|θ,H1) p (θ|H1) dθ
= ln
∫
exph(θ|H1) dθ
≈ ln
∫
exph(Θ̂|H1)+
1
2 (θ−Θ̂)
T
H(θ−Θ̂) dθ
=h
(
Θ̂|H1
)
+ ln
∫
exp
1
2 (θ−Θ̂)
T
H(θ−Θ̂)dθ
=h
(
Θ̂|H1
)
+
1
2
ln |2piH|
= ln p
(
Θ̂|H1
)
+ ln p
(
m|Θ̂,H1
)
+ ln
∣∣2piH−1∣∣1/2 .
Finally, the marginal likelihood estimate can be written as
p̂ (m|H1) = p
(
Θ̂|H1
)
p
(
m|Θ̂,H1
) ∣∣2piH−1∣∣1/2 . (25)
In (25), p
(
Θ̂|H1
)
and
∣∣2piH−1∣∣1/2 are both constant for a
specific Θ̂; thus the Laplace approximated likelihood function,
p̂ (m|H1), is a K dimensional normal distribution with the
same variance as p(m|H0) (because the variances of p(m|H0)
and p(m|θ,H1) are the same). Under the Laplace approxima-
tion the decision rule in (5) is approximated by
Λ̂ (m) =
p̂ (m|H1)
p (m|H0)
D1≥
<
D0
TΛ. (26)
To study the performance our Laplace approximation we
calculate ROC curves for both the numerical Monte Carlo
calculation of p(m|H1) and the Laplace approximation of
p(m|H1). These different forms are then used in the same
decision rule (5) in order to form the ROC curves. The results
of these simulations are shown in Fig. 7, and as we can see
the approximation is a good one for the parameters used. We
have further investigated the accuracy of the approximation
over a range of other parameters, finding similar results to
those shown in Fig. 7.
B. Discussion
In the preceding sections we have looked at a general attack
scenario under specific threat models. The attack scenario we
have focussed on is that of a non-colluding adversary who is
attempting to spoof he is within the perimeter of some wireless
network, when in reality he is some distance beyond the
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Fig. 7. Numerical and Laplace approximated ROC curves with different
values of K , where σdB = 5, L = 1, R1 = 100m, and R2 = 500m.
network boundary. A non-colluding adversary who is within
the network region will in general be easily identified due
to his inability to set different received signal strengths at
different BSs. An attack from outside the network region is
the perhaps most realistic and likely scenario one can imagine
for the emerging ITS scenario. For example, a single adversary
who is some distance from the highway (so as not to be easily
identified or caught) is attempting to disrupt proper functioning
of the ITS on the highway.
What we have shown through our investigations of specific
threat models under our general attack scenario, is that an
optimal LVS can be developed for each threat model, but
in a non-straightforward manner in most cases - i.e. no
closed-form solutions for the detection and false positive rates
are available. Without such closed-form solutions for these
rates, one must resort to complex and time consuming Monte
Carlo simulations in order to determine the optimal threshold.
However, from considerations of the FFA, and how other threat
models can be approximated under the FFA, we have shown
how a straightforward LVS algorithm can be deployed which is
effectively optimal for most circumstances. More specifically,
using analytical solutions for the detection and false positive
rates in the FFA setting, which are then used in easily
determining the optimal threshold value, a straightforward
LVS is developed whose performance is near-optimal when the
adversary is close to the network, and optimal as the adversary
moves to a large distance from network.
However, of course more sophisticated attacks than those
highlighted above are possible. The most obvious of these
is that of colluding adversaries who can communicate and
cooperate with each other so as to form collective attacks on
the LVS. An example of such an attack would be colluding
adversaries who set different received signal strengths at differ-
ent BSs. On the defensive side, the network could also deploy
beam-forming techniques to help the LVS thwart these types
of attacks. The LVS could also deploy tracking algorithms and
physical layer security techniques to assist in its defense. These
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more sophisticated forms of attack and their corresponding
defensive strategies are out of scope of the current work, but do
form part of our ongoing research efforts in this area. However,
we should be clear that ultimately any defensive strategy for
an LVS is ultimately doomed if the colluding adversary is
afforded unlimited resources and the communications network
is purely classical in nature.3
In this work, we assume error free location estimation for
the legitimate users. In fact, if the localization error is small
relative to the scale of the network boundary, the effects of
this error can be ignored. To verify this, we have carried
out additional Monte Carlo simulations identical to those
producing Fig. 5 except the localization error for legitimate
users is assumed to follow a bivariate normal distribution. We
find the results are negligibly different from those shown in
Fig. 5 even if the variance of the localization error in each
coordinate is 100 m2. It is perhaps worth noting that the prior
distributions of the localization error and a malicious user’s
location are different, and we could not distinguish between
them if there is an overlap between the two distributions.
Inaccurate knowledge of the system and channel parameters
will reduce the LVS performance. We have quantified this for
our specific LVS by carrying out additional simulations in
which knowledge of the input LVS parameters are modified
by up to 50% from the true underlying parameters. We find
that such errors induce an 40% error in the value of the
optimal threshold. However, we do point out that this is a
worse case scenario as we have assumed in our simulations
that the attacker retains perfect knowledge of the parameters
(which in reality will be untrue) so as to perform the optimal
attack (optimal power boost). We should also note that any
spatial correlation of shadowing beyond that accounted for by
the shadowing standard deviation has not been included in
our simulations. Any such correlation would add additional
uncertainty into any LVS system unless it had been pre-
measured and included as part of the channel model.
C. Results in Relation to Other Works
Location verification has been an active research area, and
many verification algorithms have been proposed for VANETs
e.g. [12]–[19], wireless sensor networks e.g. [21], [31], and
generic wireless networks e.g. [22]–[30].
Perhaps the most closely related works to ours are those
which propose optimizing the system’s threshold by minimiz-
ing the probability of misclassification (e.g. [27]), which is
defined as Pe = P0α + (1 − P0)(1 − β). Of course, a direct
comparison between such systems and ours is not entirely
meaningful, due to the different optimization metrics being
used. Further to this, it is important to note the complex
interplay between the entropy of a random variable, H(X),
and the probability of misclassification. Although it may seem
3Note that location verification in the context of quantum communications
systems has previously been considered e.g. [41], [42], [43], and it has been
argued that such systems are able to securely verify a location under all
known threat models [44] - although see [45] who argue otherwise. It is
undisputed that classical communications alone cannot achieve secure location
verification under all known threat models.
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fication (Pe) with different values of TΛ. (Note here the system and network
parameters are same as those utilized in Fig. 3.)
at first counter-intuitive, the fact is that there is not a one-to-
one relationship between H(X) and Pe. That is, two random
variables with the same entropy can have different Pe [46].
This same issue extends to NMI and Pe, and in the context
of our LVS, it is important to recognize this fact. As such,
if optimization of Pe is the system objective, then use of a
Bayesian hypothesis, where the costs of all types of classifi-
cations are equal, will suffice.4 But again we must stress that
in the context of real-world LVS deployments this represents
a strong subjective decision on the cost of misclassifications.
Given the complexity, and the many different roles of location
information within the ITS scenario (crash avoidance, vehicle-
congestion avoidance, vehicle-to-vehicle communication pro-
tocols etc.), proper determination of misclassification costs
will be, at best, extremely complex in nature. It is for this
reason we have approached optimization of our LVS from an
objective information-theoretic viewpoint. Our guiding light
has been the well-known Infomax principle [47], which states
an optimal system must transfer as much information as
possible from its input to its output - i.e. maximizes the mutual
information between its inputs and outputs.
Notwithstanding the above discussion, we compare the
optimal thresholds for NMI and Pe, as shown in Fig. 8. From
this figure, we can see that for P0 = 0.5 the optimal threshold
(TΛ = 1) is the same for both algorithms. However, the
optimal thresholds for the two algorithms are different when
P0 = 0.9. Further, we see that in the P0 = 0.9 case, the
change in Pe, if the optimal NMI threshold is used instead of
the optimal Pe threshold, is significantly less than the change
in NMI if the optimal Pe threshold is used instead of the
optimal NMI threshold.
4In a more general Bayesian framework, the average Bayesian cost is
defined as C = P0αC0+(1−P0)(1−β)C1 , where C0 is the pre-assigned
cost of rejecting a legitimate user, and C1 is the pre-assigned cost of accepting
a malicious user [34]. If C0 and C1 are known or can be set, the Bayesian
framework is optimal for an LVS in the sense that it minimizes the average
Bayesian cost (Pe is the special case of C with C0 = C1 = 1).
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We expand upon this last point in Fig. 9 where the optimal
thresholds for each system are plotted as functions of P1 =
1 − P0. This figure outlines another pragmatic advantage of
the NMI approach. In reality, the base rate of intrusions (P1 =
1 − P0) is an unknown parameter for all LVS systems. As
such, we see from Fig. 9 that the use of NMI results in a
more robust system. As the true value of P1 approaches small
values (in any real situation it will be small) the NMI threshold
is insensitive to the assumed P1. This means that when using
NMI as the optimization metric, any mismatch between true
P1 and assumed P1 has little impact on system performance.
In the Bayesian framework, however, the optimal threshold for
minimizing Pe remains very sensitive (linear) to the assumed
value of P1. In this latter case, a mismatch between true P1
and assumed P1 results in very poor system performance.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we developed an information-theoretic frame-
work for an LVS, utilizing as the objective optimization
criterion the mutual information between input and output
data of the LVS. We investigated our new optimal LVS under
a realistic threat model, showing how in a straightforward
implementation of an LVS, information-theoretic optimality
is approached as the non-colluding adversary moves further
from the network region it is claiming to be within. This
straightforward implementation makes our new algorithm an
ideal candidate for the LVS that will be needed in emerging
network-based and safety-enhanced transportation systems,
such as ITS.
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